I investigate novel solutions to metaphysical puzzles, the logic underlying those solutions, and metaphysical consequences of those solutions. These metaphysical puzzles are often cases which force a choice between intuitive, but incompatible claims. By novel solutions, I mean those that attempt to reconcile the incompatible claims, not by rejecting one, but rather by rejecting a background assumption in the case that is rarely questioned. I am particularly interested in solutions which require revising a common assumption about an important metaphysical concept or relation (like existence, identity, or composition) and revisions that articulated using non-standard logics.

I am also the current editor for the subcateogry
Vague Identity on

Current Work


  • forthcoming. "Transitivity When the Same are Distinct." Erkenntnis.
    It is widely assumed that the identity relation is, among other things, transitive. Some have proposed that the identity relation might hold between objects contingently or occasionally. If, on those proposals, identity is shown to not be transitive, then there is reason to reject such proposals. One such argument attempts to show that the identity relation on such proposals violates transitivity in cases of 'simultaneous' fissions and fusion. I argue that, even in those cases, contingent identity and occasional identity are transitive.


  • 2021. "Pluarlisms from Possiblities." Eastern APA.
    I present a new test pluralism. Extending the work of Kris McDaniel, I argue that the possibility of systematic variable behavior is evidence of pluralism.

In Progress

  • I argue that contingent identity theorists ought to identity pluralists.
  • I argue that an overlooked result of Terence Parsons' solution to Theseus' Ship has widespread implications for his view. I argue that the overlooked result is that his solution means every ship in the series is indeterminately identical to the ship before and after it. That is, the solution turns the case into a series of indeterminate identities. I then argue that this means any change in parts is sufficient for indetermiante identity. This makes indeterminate identity surprisingly pervasive.
  • Cody Gilmore has argued that the parthood relation concrete objects stand in and the parthood relation constituents of propositions stand in to propositions is 1) the same, and 2) is a 4-place relation. I argue that the ontological differences in concrete and abstract locations means these relations are not the same parthood relation.