I investigate novel solutions to metaphysical puzzles, the logic underlying those solutions, and metaphysical consequences of those solutions. These metaphysical puzzles are often cases which force a choice between intuitive, but incompatible claims. By novel solutions, I mean those that attempt to reconcile the incompatible claims, not by rejecting one, but rather by rejecting a background assumption in the case that is rarely questioned. I am particularly interested in solutions which require revising a common assumption about an important metaphysical concept or relation (like existence, identity, or composition) and revisions that articulated using non-standard logics.

    I am also the current editor for the subcateogry
    Vague Identity on PhilPapers.org.



    Current Work

    Under Review

    • I argue that contingent identity theorists ought to identity pluralists.

    Upcoming Presentations

    • 2021. "Pluarlisms from Possiblities." Eastern APA.
      I present a new test pluralism. Extending the work of Kris McDaniel, I argue that the possibility of systematic variable behavior is evidence of pluralism.

    In Progress

    • I argue that an overlooked result of Terence Parsons' solution to Theseus' Ship has widespread implications for his view. I argue that the overlooked result is that his solution means every ship in the series is indeterminately identical to the ship before and after it. That is, the solution turns the case into a series of indeterminate identities. I then argue that this means any change in parts is sufficient for indetermiante identity. This makes indeterminate identity surprisingly pervasive.
    • Ralf Bader has argued that contingent and occasional identities cannot be transitive. This comes from considering cases of simulatenous fissions and fusions. I argue for a modification of the relations that preserves transitivity, even in these cases. Additionally, I show that these modifications are consistent with a view of instantiation put forth by a defender of contingent and occassional identity.
    • Cody Gilmore has argued that the parthood relation concrete objects stand in and the parthood relation constituents of propositions stand in to propositions is 1) the same, and 2) is a 4-place relation. I argue that the ontological differences in concrete and abstract locations means these relations are not the same parthood relation.